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Davies Bagambiire* The Constitution and Immigration:
The Impact of the Proposed
Changes to the Immigration
Power Under the
Constitution Act, 1867
I. Introduction
In the fall of 1991, the federal government of Prime Minister Brian
Mulroney put forward to the nation a set of constitutional proposals (the
"proposals") on reforming the Constitution.) Apart from the Keith Spicer
Commission, the proposals were the first major initiative on constitutional
reform since the failure of the Meech Lake Accord2 in 1990. The
suggested areas of reform included the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms3 ("the Charter"), property rights, the notwithstanding clause,
Quebec's distinctiveness, aboriginal self-government, the Senate,
appointing justices to the Supreme Court of Canada, the formula for
amending the Constitution, inter-provincial trade barriers, the Bank of
Canada, and several others. Immigration was dealt with as part of the
economic union. Although the proposals on immigration have not attracted
much attention, their probable effect would be profound. The objective
of the government in this respect was set out as follows:
While recognising the federal role in setting Canadian policy and national
objectives with respect to immigration, the Government of Canada is
prepared to negotiate with any province agreements appropriate to the
circumstances of that province and to constitutionalize those agreements.4
This principle is similar to the one that underlay the Meech Lake Accord
on the issue of reforming the immigration power under the Constitution.
In Meech Lake as well, specific legal language embodying the principle
was provided. The section on "agreements on immigration and aliens"
*Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School Halifax, Nova Scotia. LL.B (Hons)(Dar Es
Salaam, Tanz.); DLP (Law Development Centre, Kampala); LL.M (Dalhousie, N.S.); of the
Bar of Nova Scotia,'79.
1. Shaping Canada's Future Together (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1991).
2. 1987 Constitutional Accord, concluded following meetings of the First Ministers on the
Constitution, April 30, andJune3,1987, and the Schedule thereto, being suggested amendments
to the Constitution Act, 1867. Annotated and reproduced Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional
Accord Annotated, (Toronto: Carswell, 1988).
3. Constitution Act, 1982, Part I.
4. Supra, note 1, atp. 57.
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would commit the government to negotiate immigration agreements with
the provinces upon request. The negotiated agreements could be
proclaimed as law if there were resolutions to that effect from the Senate,
the House of Commons and the legislature of the province in question.
Once proclaimed as law, they would be governed by the Charter.5
The Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House
of Commons on a Renewed Canada, (the "Beaudoin-Dobbie Report"), 6
contains recommendations that are identical to those that had been
advanced in Meech Lake. The Committee was set up as part of the
proposals. Its report recommends amending the Constitution Act, 1867 to
include the following changes relating to agreements on immigration and
aliens:
95B. The Government of Canada shall, at the request of any province,
negotiate with the government of that province for thepurpose of concluding
an agreement relating to immigration or thetemporary admission of aliens
into that province that is appropriate to the needs and circumstances of that
province.
95C. (1) Any agreement concluded between Canada and a province in
relation to immigration or the temporary admission of aliens into that
province has the force of law from the time it is declared to do so in
accordance with subsection 95D (1) and shall from that time have effect
notwithstanding class 25 of section 91 or section 95.
(2) An agreement that has the force of law under subsection (1) shall have
effect only so long as it is not repugnant to any provision of an Act of the
Parliament of Canada that sets national standards and objectives relating
to immigration or aliens, including any provision that establishes general
classes of immigration or relates to levels of immigration for Canada or
that prescribes classes of individuals who are inadmissible to Canada.
(3) The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies in respect of
any agreement that has the force of law under section (1) and in respect of
anything done by the Parliament of Canada or Government of Canada, or
the legislature or government ofa province pursuant to any such agreement.
95D (1) A declaration that an agreement referred to in sub-section 95C(l)
has the force of law may be made by proclamation issued by the Governor
General under the Great Seal of Canada only where so authorised by
resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the legislative
assembly of the province that is a party to the agreement.
5. As to the text of the Meech Lake legal language, see Hogg, supra, note 2, at pp.21-22. Meech
Lake as well committed the federal government to the negotiation of an agreement with Quebec
in anticipation of the amendments to the Constitution.
6. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons (Ottawa:
Queen's Printer, February, 1992). The Committee was struck in June 1991 to inquire into and
make recommendations to Parliament on the government proposals for a renewed Canada.
Proceedings of House of Commons, June 19, 1991.
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(2) An amendment to an agreement referred to in sub-section 95C(1) may
be made by proclamation issued by the Governor General under the Great
Seal of Canada only where so authorised:
(a) by resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons and of the
legislative assembly of the province that is a party to the agreement.
(b) in such other manner as is set out in the agreement.
95E. Sections 46 to 48 of the Constitution Act, 1982 apply, with such
modifications as the circumstances require, in respect of any declaration
made pursuant to sub-section 95D(1), any amendment to an agreement
made pursuant to sub-section 95D(2).7
This article examines the impact that the suggested changes would
have on the immigration power as presently set forth in sections 95 and
91(25) of the Constitution Act, 1867, and on Canadian immigration
policy generally. First, it discusses how the present immigration power is
allocated as between the federal government and the provinces, how it has
been exercised or attempted to be exercisedby the two levels of government
and how it has evolved and been interpreted by the Courts. Secondly, it
looks at the problems that could arise as a result of the federal government
transferring some of its immigration power to the provinces and as a result
of the diminution of the paramountcy of federal over provincial legislation
in the area of immigration policy. Since the suggestion first appeared in
Meech Lake, fears have been expressed, especially by immigrant
organisations, that decentralisation of immigration policy might result in
balkanized immigrant services and the provision of adaptation and
settlement services thathave provincial, as opposed to national, outlooks.,
This article examines these fears. In looking at how the immigration
power under the Constitution has been exercised by the provinces, I
examine the experience of immigrants of colour during the period prior
to the First World War, to see how the provinces behaved and to predict
how they might behave if and when immigration power is ceded to them
in a complete or even substantial way.
Pre-First World War is significant because this is the time when some
of the provinces attempted to play an activistrole in the area of immigration.
It is also important because it was mostly during this period that the
present immigration power evolved by way of judicial analysis and
construction.
7. Supra, note 6, at pp. 80-81 and 118-120.
8. On the effect of the Meech Lake proposals on immigration, see Kruhalk, "Constitutional
'Reform and Immigration," in Gibbins, et al., eds., Meech Lake and Canada: Perspectivesfrom
the West (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988), p. 201.
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As the proposals and the Beaudoin-Dobbie Report would make
agreements a major feature of the federal-provincial immigration scene,
I further examine those agreements that have been concluded between the
federal government and at least seven of the provinces, since the 1970s.
Quebec has been the forerunner and trail-blazer in negotiating the modem
agreements. I therefore attempt to draw lessons from the Quebec experience
and to prognosticate how arming otherprovinces with similar agreements
may affect the existing balance of federal-provincial immigration power;
how it might affect immigration policy generally; and how it might affect
the nature and quality of the adaptation and settlement services dispensed
to immigrants across Canada.
My position is that it is not necessary to amend the immigration power
under the Constitution to achieve increased provincial participation in
immigration. Indeed, amending the Constitution is no guarantee that the
provinces would be out looking to negotiate agreements. If they so
wished, provinces could become more involved under the frame work of
the existing Immigration Act, 1976.9 It is also my position that a
constitutionalized amending process would be a rigid system and is not
desirable in immigration matters.
It is my further position that the federal government should not cede
most of its immigration power to the provinces by agreement whether
negotiated under the Act or an amended Constitution. I argue that a
balance be struck whereby the provinces could become more active than
they have been hitherto without totally subsuming the role of the federal
government. This argument is based on the fear of compromising
national objectives and standards in the absence of an effective monitoring
system. It is also based on the view that as seen from the experience at the
turn of this century when those provinces that attempted to legislate in the
area of immigration did so for reasons of racial prejudice, a substantial
transfer of the administration and enforcement of immigration laws
would create ten different systems which would have the potential of
impacting very adversely on Third World and visible minority immigrants.
II. The Present Immigration Power Under the Constitution
Contemporary immigration power is grounded in the provisions of
sections 95, 91(25) and 91(11) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 95
is the basis for both the federal government and provinces having power
to legislate concurrently in the area of immigration, as will be seen below.
9. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2 as amended. Originally enacted as S.C. 1976-77, c. 52. Proclaimed into
force April 1978. (hereafter "Immigration Act, 1976").
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On the other hand, under section 91(25), the power to legislate with
respectto "naturalization and aliens", is allocatedto Parliamentexclusively.
The latter section has, however, been interpreted in such a way as to
uphold provincial legislation that is within the competence of the
legislatures even if it may incidentally affect aliens. Section 91(25) has
also been interpreted as to affirm that only Parliament may legislate with
respect to aliens and with respect to the requirements for naturalisation.
I shall revert to a full discussion of each of these sections below. Suffice
it to say that the basis of Parliament legislating with respect to health and
medical standards for immigrants and aliens, is section 91(11) of the
Constitution Act, 1867,10 which authorizes Parliament to legislate with
respect to quarantine and the establishment and maintenance of marine
hospitals.
Power to Legislate Pursuant to Section 95
Under section 95, the federal government and the provinces have
concurrentpowerto legislate with respectwtoagriculture and immigration."
Section 95 which grants this power provides as follows:
In each Province the Legislature may make Laws in relation to Agriculture
in the Province, and to Immigration into the Province; and it is hereby
declared that the Parliament of Canada may from Time to Time make Laws
in relation to Agriculture in all or any of the Provinces, and to Immigration
into all or any of the Provinces; and any Law of the Legislature of a
Province relative to Agriculture or to Immigration shall have effect in and
for the Province as long and as far only as it is not repugnant to any act of
the Parliament of Canada.
There are three features to this section that should be discussed. The first
one is that any provincial legislature may make laws in relation to
immigration into that province. The second one is that Parliament may
make laws in relation to immigration into all or any of the provinces. The
third one is that federal legislation is categorically expressed to be
paramount over provincial legislation. In the event of a conflict between
a federal and a provincial law, the latter will be rendered inoperative. It
10. McKaI1, "Constitutional Jurisdiction Over Public Health" (1975), 6 Man. L.J. 317.
11. All earlier immigration legislations on the part of the federal government and the provinces
carefully and expressly recited this fact. See the preambles to both the Immigration Act, 1869
and the Immigration Act, 1872. S.C. 1869, c. 10 and S.C. 1872, c. 27, respectively. Many of
the Immigration Acts that British Columbia attempted to enact also alluded to this fact. The
modem agreements signed by the federal government and some of the provinces also make this
point.
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is subordinate to Parliament.12 A doctrine of repugnancy and paramountcy
of federal over provincial legislation is thus specifically embodied in the
section. Section 95 is the only section in the Constitution Act, 1867which
at Confederation gave explicit concurrent power to both Parliament and
the legislatures, 3 and at the same time articulated a repugnancy clause.
The concurrence applies to both immigration and agriculture. As stated
above, section 95 of the ConstitutionAct, 1867gave the power to legislate
with respect to immigration matters to both Parliament and the legislatures.
In exercise of this power, Parliament enacted the ImmigrationAct, 1869 4
as amended by the Immigration Act, 1872,- which are the forerunners to
the present legislation. However, with the exception of British Columbia
at the turn of the century, and Quebec since 1968, no other provinces have
attempted to pass an immigration statute, even though Nova Scotia and
Lower Canada (Quebec) had pre-Confederation immigration laws.' 6 On
the whole, the provinces have not been enthusiastic legislators in the area
of immigration.
12. See In re Narain Singh et al. (1908), 13 B.C.R. 477; R v. Narain (1908), 8 W.L.R. 790
(B.C.S.C.). The Court struck down a British Columbia Act on the ground that under the
constitutional doctrine of paramountcy, the field it sought to cover, had already been occupied
by Parliament. This doctrine was best articulated by the Privy Council, in Attorney-Generalfor
Canada v. Attorney-Generalfor British Columbia, [1930] A.C. 111 (P.C.), at p.118:
"There can be a domain in which provincial and Dominion legislation may overlap, in
which case neither legislation will be ultra vires if the field is clear, but if the field is not
clear and the two legislations meet the Dominion legislation must prevail".
13. In 1951, s. 94A respecting old age pension as revised in 1964, was added. In 1982, ss.
92A(2) and 92A(3) regarding natural resources, were added. The power conferred on the
provinces by this section is concurrent with the federal power over trade and commerce. Ss.
92(2) and 92A(4) respecting taxation are also concurrent with the federal power under S. 91(3)
even though this concurrence is not explicit.
14. S.C. 1869, c. 10.
15. An Act to Amend the Immigration Act of 1869, S.C. 1878, c. 28. First enacted as 1872, 35
Vic., c. 27.
16. Lower Canada had a statute known as An Act Respecting Aliens, 1794, and the Province
of Nova Scotia had a statute known as An Act Respecting Aliens Coming into This Province,
orResiding Therein, 1798, George III, c. 1 (N. S.). The Nova Scotia Act required aliens to be
in possession of residence permits. Violators were liable to imprisonment and deportation if
convicted. Nova Scotia as well had a statute known as An Act to Prevent the Clandestine
Landing of Liberated Slaves, and Other Persons Therein Mentioned, From Vessels Arriving
in This Province, S.N.S. 1834, c. 68, whose objective was to accomplish exactly what its title
said.
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Between 1871 and 1908, British Columbiaenacted several immigration
and immigration related statutes. 17Unfortunately, the real motive behind
British Columbia's legislative initiative was racism, bigotry and
anti-Chinese sentiment and prejudice as opposed to being a desire to
exercise legislative power under section 95. Even though most of the
legislation was either disallowed by the federal government orinvalidated
by the Courts, 8 the invalidation was never based on the fact that the
legislation was racist and discriminatory, but, in several instances, on
grounds of lack of constitutional jurisdiction to pass the legislation. In the
process, the Courts carried out an extensive analysis of section 91(25) of
the Constitution Act, 1867 and in a limited way attempted to defie the
scope of section 95.
One of the first cases to deal with the issues was R. v. Narain.19 It
involved determination of the validity of the so called "literacy test".
These were tests that had been established by the provincial government
pursuant to the British Columbia Immigration Act, 1908.20 They made it
unlawful for any one who could not read or write in the English or some
other European language to immigrate to British Columbia. The
constitutionality of the Act was put in issue on the ground that Parliament
had already occupied the field. Under the federal ImmigrationAct, 190621
the Governor-in-Council had power to establish such a test although none
had been established. The Province took the position that as there were
no federal "literacy criteria", its Act establishing the tests was valid. The
17. The attempts by British Columbia to legislate in immigration and related areas included:
The LabourRegulationAct, 1898, S.B.C. 1898,c. 28;British Columbia lmmigrationAct, 1900,
S.B.C. 1900, c. 11; British Columbia Immigration Act, 1902, S.B.C. 1902, c. 34; British
Columbia ImmigrationAct, 1903, S.B.C. 1903, c. 12; British Columbia ImmigrationAct, 1904,
S.B.C. 1903-4, c. 26; British Columbia Immigration Act, 1905, S.B.C. 1905, c. 28; British
Columbia Immigration Act, 1908, S.B.C. 1908, c. 23.
18. For a list of the British Columbia statues that were disallowed by the Governor-General,
see La Forest, Disallowance andReservation ofProvincialLegislation (Dep. of Justice: 1955).
19. Supra, note 12.
20. British Columbia Immigration Act, 1908, S.B.C. 1908 c. 23. Section 4 of the Act provided
as follows:
"The immigration into British Columbia of any person who, when asked to do so by the
officer appointed under this Act, shall fall himself to write out and sign, in the English
language, or any language of Europe, an application... as well as read in Engfish, or any
language of Europe, any test submitted to him by the officer appointed under this Act,
shall be unlawful."
In Re Nakane and Re Okasake, [1908] 8 W.W.R. 19 (B.C.C.A.) the Court held that federal
treaty legislation whereby immigrants of Japanese nationality were entitled to enter and reside
in any part ofCanadawithout restriction, overrode theBritish Columbia ImmigrationAct, 1908
which imposed literacy tests as a condition for admission.
21. Immigration Act, 1906, R.S.C. 1906, c. 93, originally enacted as S.C. 1906, c. 19. The
Immigration Acts of 1869 and 1872 had been repealed and replaced by this Act.
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Supreme Court of British Columbia rejected this view. It established the
firm principle that under section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 a
provincial legislature could not legislate in an area of immigration where
Parliament had already occupied the field. Parliament had occupied the
field by virtue of the fact that it could at any time have promulgated such
tests. The undoubted effect of this decision was to consolidate the
supremacy of Parliament over that of the legislatures, and to discourage
the provinces from taking legislative adventures in matters of immigration.
In reality, Narain was not about provincial concern with the level of
literacy of immigrants crossing the borders of British Columbia. It was
concerned about keeping immigrants of non-European origin, especially
the Chinese, out of the province. The language test requirements were a
vehicle calculated to eliminate Chinese immigrants and other immigrants
of colour. It was bound to affect these immigrants more adversely than it
would have affected immigrants from Britain and North-Western Europe
whom British Columbia preferred. It is significant that the invalidation of
the "literacy" legislation by the Supreme Court of British Columbia was
based upon narrow constitutional grounds, notwithstanding the obvious
and plain racism.22
In Re the Immigration Act and Munshi Singh, 3 at issue was the
authority of Parliament to legislate deportation of a British subject from
Canada under section 95. The case had to do with the removal of an East
Indian immigrant from Canada. The British Columbia Court of Appeal
held that the power to legislate in respect of immigration into Canada had
been vested in Parliament. On that basis, it upheld federal regulations
which discriminated against immigrants of Asian origin on grounds of
race. It also upheld a regulation prohibiting the admission into this
country, of persons whosejourneys to the Canadian ports of entry had not
been "continuous" from the countries of which they were native, on the
theory that Parliament had the authority to enact legislation restricting
immigration into Canada.24
22. Edward McWhinneyhas called this "ajudicial insensitiveness to racial out-groups and their
special problems that almost implies judicially held policies of a ...'racialist', character". See
McWhinney, "Equality Before the Law", in T. Koopmans, ed., Constitutional Protection of
Equality (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1975), p. 62.
23. (1914), VI W.W.R. 1347 (B.C.C.A.).
24. Munshi Singh involved alleged violations of three kinds of Orders-in-Council made
pursuant to the Immigration Act of the time. Under the first Order (the continuous journey
Order), immigrants who had not travelled to Canada by continuous journeys from their
countries of origin were prohibited from landing in Canada. Under the second Order, all
immigrants of Asiatic race were required to be in possession of money in their own right, in
the amount of at least $ 200.00, a quite large sum at the time. The third Order imposed a ban
on skilled or unskilled artisans or labourers from landing in certain ports of Canada including
Vancouver.
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When one considers the level oftechnology and means of transportation
that existed in 1914, itbecomes obvious that only immigrants of European
and American origin could have immigrated to Canada without offending
the "continuous journey" regulations. It also becomes obvious that this
was a racist regulation whose objective was to keep immigrants of
non-European origin out of Canada. The Munshi Singh Court was not,
however, prepared to confront this racism. It was content to simply hold
that the regulations were intra vires of Parliament by virtue of section 95
of the Constitution Act, 1867.
Section 95 has also been used by the Courts to uphold federal
legislation that has only had peripheral relevancy to immigration. In Re
The Soldier Settlement Act, In re McManus, 5 a District Court judge in
Saskatchewan upheld the validity of a federal statute dealing with the
resettlement of returning veterans of the First World War.26 The statute
had been enacted as a post-war measure to enable the re-settlement of
returning war soldiers and to facilitate the colonization of vacant land by
these soldiers, and by soldiers from allied countries. The Court argued
that the jurisdiction to enact the legislation was to be found in the peace,
order and good government clause, and in section 95 of the Constitution
Act, 1867. By allowing foreign veterans to resettle in Canada, the statute
constituted an immigration scheme and was valid under section 95.
There is no provincial immigration Act that has been held valid or
operative by virtue of section 95. There have not been many immigration
Acts passed by provinces to be tested. One can only surmise that the
provinces have refrained from enacting immigration laws for fear they
would be ruled inconsistent with, and inoperative by virtue of the
paramountcy of, the federal legislation.27 Although this is not intended to
cast doubt, the Quebec legislations has never been tested for inconsistency
with the federal immigration Act.
25. [193914 D.L.R. 759; 119391 2 W.W.R. 199 (Sask. Dist. Ct).
26. The Soldier Settlement Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 188.
27. Peter W. Hogg describes the effect of inconsistency as follows:
"Once it has been determined that a federal law is inconsistent with a provincial law,
the doctrine of federal paramountcy stipulates that the provincial law must yield to the
federal law. The most usual and most accurate way of describing the effect on the
provincial law is to say that it is rendered inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency."
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985), p. 367.
28. Immigration DepartmentAct, R.S.Q. 1977, c. M- 16, originally enacted as S.Q. 1968, c. 68.
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The Linking of Immigration and Agriculture in the Constitution
The grouping together of immigration and agriculture was not an accident.
It was dictated by considerations of the political-economy of the day. At
Confederation, agriculture was the mainstay of the Canadian economy 39
Canada was still in the pre-industrial stage and most of the immigrants
coming to this country were either farmers or were destined to engage in
agricultural activity. Therefore, it was inevitable that immigration policy
would be linked to agriculture. The legacy of linking immigration policy
to agricultural considerations is the continued linkage of immigration
policy to the economy and the labour market conditions. However, while
nineteenth century linkage involved agricultural considerations, mostly
land resource, as the economy has become an intricate industrial complek,
twentieth century linkage is between the skills of the potential immigrant,
and the benefit to the economy that the immigrant would bring to Canada.
As Wydrynski has written:
A labour and economic orientation has become the standard of success for
immigration policy. Its basic aim has become the encouragement of
domestic economic stability. To a large extent, immigration has become
a legal framework for human resource development to benefit domestic
economic considerations."0
This trend is not new. It has been developing from the time of the
enactment of the first immigration legislation for Canada, the Immigration
Act, 186931 as amended by the Immigration Act, 1872.32 For most of the
time in the history of Canada, immigration has fallen under the umbrella
of the department or ministry in charge of the human resources needs of
the domestic economy. This is what the history of the legislative and
administrative frame work of immigration clearly reveals. For almost
forty years, from 1869 to 1906, immigration was the responsibility of the
Minister of Agriculture.3 As has been observed, at the time, agriculture
was the department in the greatest need of human resources. Between
1906 and 1918, it fell under the ministry of the interior. 4 In 1918, as the
29. McConnell, Commentary on the British North America Act (Toronto: Macmillan of
Canada, 1977), p.300:
"In 1867 agriculture was overwhelmingly the occupation of the great majority of
Canadians and the concurrence of the agriculture power was inevitable." .
30. Wydrzynski, Canadian Immigration Law andProcedure (Aurora, Ontario: Canadian Law
Book, 1983), p. 40.
31. Supra, note 14.
32. Supra, note 15.
33. See section 15(2) of the Immigration Act, 1869, supra, note 14, and section 4 of the
Immigration Act, 1872, supra, note 15.
34. S. 2(f), Immigration Act, 1906, R.S.C. 1906, c. 93, originally enacted as S.C. 1906, c. 19,
and s. 2(a), Immigration Act, 1910 S.C. 1910.
438 The Dalhousie Law Journal
First World War came closer to the end, a department of Immigration and
Colonization was created.35 It took over responsibility for immigration
matters and for the settlement of the returning war veterans.36 Interi6r was
crucial to the management of the domestic affairs and the economy during
the war. Immigration and CoIonization was vital to the resettlement of the
war veterans and the provision of the manpower needs of the post-war
industrial economy. One of the effects of the war on Canada had been to
spur industrialization. The Department of Immigration and Colonization
was abolished in 1936. Immigration became a branch of the Department
of Mines and Resources.37 This was partly due to the inter-war depression
and marked the first time that immigration was not associated with a
leading economic department. As agriculture declined and became
increasingly peripheral, the needs of the labour market became the prime
factor in dictating immigration policy, and the linkage of immigration to
agriculture became even more remote, except by Constitution only.38 In
1949, a Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created and
immigration was moved from Mines and Resources, to Citizenship and
Immigration. 39 In 1967, immigration was once again transferred.
Citizenship and Immigration was abolished and replaced by a Department
of Manpower and Immigration. 4° Its creation formalized the linkage
between immigration and the labour market demands and symbolized the
culmination oftheprocess thathadbegun immediately after Confederation.
The new Minister of Manpower and Immigration became charged with
responsibility for"the development and utilization of manpower resources
in Canada, employment services and immigration. '41 1967, however,
was not only important for the formal marriage of immigration policy to
the labour market conditions; it was also important because a completely
35. Department ofImmigration and Colonization Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 96. Originally enacted
as S.C. 1918, c. 3. The duties of the Minister in charge of this department were to administer
theImmigrationActs 1869and1872,supra, notes 14 and 15, the Chinese ImmigrationAct, S.C.
1885, c. 71, and any other related matters.
36. Immigration was transferred to the new department of Immigration and Colonization,
through an amendment to thelmmigrationAct, 1910, S.C. 1910, c. 27, byAnActtoAmend The
Immigration Act, S.C. 1919, c. 25. Under the amendment, the administration of immigration
laws and concerns became the job of the Minister of Immigration and Colonization.
37. The Department of Mines and Resources Act, S.C. 1936, c. 33. The Minister of Mines and
Resources became the Minister responsible for the enforcement of immigration policy.
38. In 1936, the Department of Immigration and Colonization was abolished. Immigration
became a branch of the Department of Mines and Resources.
39. Department of Citizenship and Immigration Act, S.C. 1949, c. 16.
40. Government Organisation Act, S.C. 1966, c. 11. Became effective in 1967.
41. Government Organisation Act, 1966, S.C. 1966-7, c. 25, ss. 11-14.
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new regime in the administration and enforcement of immigration policy
was established. In addition to the setting up of the Department of
Manpower and Immigration, a new administrative tribunal, the
Immigration Appeal Board, was created to adjudicate immigration issues.42
It was given exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals in fact and law by
sponsors, and appeals against deportation orders.43 In addition, regulations
establishing a system of selecting and recruiting immigrants to this
country based on points' (the "point system") were promulgated. The
point system awards units for criteria that include the level of education
and age of the immigrant; his or her level of vocational preparation and
job experience; demand for the intended occupation; whether or not
employment has been designated or pre-arranged; the occupation of the
immigrant; the demographic needs of the province or territory of
destination; knowledge of the national languages; andpersonal suitability.
All immigrants, with the exception of members of the family class and
Convention refugees seeking resettlement, are admitted on the basis of
the number of units scored during assessment. The regulations stipulate
different minimum unit requirements for different categories of
immigrants. They exist primarily to serve the interests and needs of the
capitalist labour market of Canada. While they were promoted as a
"neutral" system, they are not as "neutral" in practice as they are believed
to be in theory.45
42. The ImmigrationAppealBoardwas established by thelmmigrationAppealBoardAct, S.C.
1966-7, c. 90.
43. Pringle et at. v. Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821; (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 28.
44. The point system was established by P.C. 1967-1616 of August 16,1967 which came into
force on October 1, 1967.
45. There is no sufficient room here and it is not the purpose of this paper to critique the point
system. That will be left for another occasion. On the issue, however, see, Law Union of Ontario,
The Immigrant's Hand Book: A Critical Guide (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1981), p.40.
"The point system was introduced for a number of reasons. First, by 1967 racist
ideology was under sufficient attack that governments were reluctant to openly endorse
racism. Second, the requirements of Canada's employers demanded selection criteria
which would identify and admit people with specialized skills. And third, European
immigration to Canada had declined to the point that Canada was forced to admit
non-European immigrants in order to meet the demand for labour.
The point system still exists today. Although discrimination is not clearly visible in
the point system, the traditional white Anglo immigrants continue to be preferred. The
criteria themselves are not 'neutral' in that all people don't have an equal opportunity to
meet the criteria. For example, education is available for a greater number of years in
some countries than in others. As well, the 'adaptability' of an immigrant is determined
through a personal interview with an immigration officer so that a biased officer could
easily prejudice an application by awarding no points for 'adaptability'. Racism is also
manifest in the distribution of immigration offices, which are more numerous in the
traditional source countries than in countries of the Third World."
The point system as established in 1967 was replaced with new revised criteria as
part of the Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, which are presently in force.
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In 1977, through another package of reform, the department of
Manpower and Immigration that had been created in 1967 was changed
to the department of Employment and Immigration, and a Canada
Employment and Immigration Commission was set up within this
department.46 As part of this package, the Immigration Act, 1952, which
had from time to time been amended but not replaced, was repealed and
replaced with the existing Immigration Act, 1976.47
Power to Legislate with Respect to Naturalization and Aliens
The present immigration power under the Constitution includes the
power allocated to Parliament by section 91(25) of the Constitution Act,
1867 to legislate exclusively with respect to "naturalization and aliens".
The phrase "naturalization and aliens" has been the subject of extensive
judicial construction and analysis almost from the time of Confederation.
Numerous attempts have been made by the Canadian courts to delimit the
parameters of this phrase with no satisfactory results. Chief Justice Bora
Laskin aptly stated some of the difficulties posed by an attempt to analyze
this heading when he asked the following questions:
Is any special significance to be attached to the fact that Dominion power
under s. 91(25) is in relation to "naturalization", not naturalized persons;
and "aliens" not alienage? Or should the Courts read the terms as if they
were "naturalization and naturalized persons and aliens and alienage"?
What is the extent of Dominion power to legislate as to the consequences
of citizenship ornationality or alienage, in the light ofprovincial legislative
authority, especially in relation to property and civil rights in the province?
How far can a provincial legislature regulate or limit the activities of or
deny privileges to naturalized persons or aliens? Does the B.N.A. Act (now
the Constitution Act, 1867) protect such classes of persons from
discriminatory treatment only? Or, are they protected against provincial
legislation even where a natural-born person would not be protected? 8
With a Constitution that boasts an entrenched Charter, the analysis may
take a different approach. This was shown to be the case in Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia 49to which I shall revert in due course.
46. Employment and Immigration Department And Commission Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-5,
originally enacted as S.C. 1976-77, c. 54.
47. Supra, note 9.
48. Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law, Cases, Text and Notes on Distribution of Legislative
Power, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1969), p. 991. On the status of aliens in Canada generally,
see Head, "The Stranger in Our Midst: A Sketch of the Legal Status of the Alien in Canada",
(1964) vol. H, The Canadian Yearbook of International Law, 107.
49. (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
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To fully grasp the present immigration power, however, it still remains
significant to analyze the cases in which the "naturalization and aliens"
constitutional contradiction was battled prior to the advent of the Charter
and prior to Andrews.
The beginning point is the celebrated decision of the Privy Council in
Union Colliery Company of British Columbia Limited, et al. v. Bryden
andAttorney-GeneralforBritish Columbia.5 0 At issue was the validity of
the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 18901 of British Columbia which
prohibited Chinese from engaging in underground coal workings.
It was impugned on the ground that it related to aliens within the
meaning of section 91(25), the legislative authority which had been
allocated exclusively to Parliament and was ultra vires of the provincial
legislature. It was defended by the province as a valid exercise of its
power over "property and civil rights" under section 92(13).
In actual fact, the Act had been enacted in response to pressure from
organized white labour which wanted the Chinese excluded from
competing for underground jobs in the coal mines. A series of explosions
had occurred in the mines for which they had been made scapegoats. The
white miners, who were resentful of the industry of the Chinese, used this
as a pretext to demand they be excluded from the mines.52 Bowing to their
pressure, the provincial government had amended the Act to include the
Chinese among the prohibited categories.53
'As was to be expected, the mining interests did not favour the
amendment to the Act. It sought to eliminate access to Chinese labour
which was easier to exploit through lower wages than was white labour.
50. [1899] A.C. 580 (P.C.). There are other cases, decided and reported before Bryden, such
as Tai Sing v. Maguire (1878), 1 B.C.R. 101 (S.C.), and R. v. Corporation of Victoria (1888),
1 B.C.R. 331 (S.C.), which in a peripheral way touch on the issue of provincial legislatures
legislating with respect to aliens. In.Maguire, the Court struck down the Chinese TaxAct, 1878
which imposed provincial taxes on the Chinese, and in Corp. of Vic. the Court declared that a
provincial legislature and a municipality did not have the right to deny certain individuals
business licenses on the basis of their nationalities. Both Maguire and Corp. of Vic., however,
were based primarily on the argument that the restrictions infringed upon the federal power to
regulate trade and commerce under 91(2), even though 91(25), was alluded to.
51. R.S.B.C. 1897, c. 138.
52. Generally on the relationship between the White British Columbians and the Chinese, see:
Ferguson, A White Man's Country (Toronto: Doubleday, 1975); Daniels, Anti-Chinese
Violence in North America (New York: Arno Press, 1978); Ward, White Canada Forever:
Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal:
McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978); Roy, A White Man's Province: British Columbia
Politicians and Chinese and Japansimmigrants, 1858-1914 (Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1989).
53. The amendment was carried out in 1890. The Coal Mines Regulation Act, of 1888, c. 138,
did not contain the prohibition.
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In the racial struggle that ensued between the Chinese and white labour,
therefore, convenience and self-interest made capital and the mining
interests an ally of the Chinese. John Bryden, who spearheaded the
litigation to invalidate the Act, was both a shareholder in the Union
Colliery Company and the son-in-law of Robert Dunsmuir who owned it.
He sued the company in order to give it the opportunity to argue against
the Act and get it invalidated. The Privy Council held that the Act was
valid. Its opinion, delivered by Lord Watson, included the following
statement:
Their Lordships see no reason to doubt that, by virtue of section 91, subs.
25, the legislature of the Dominion is invested with exclusive authority in
all matters which directly concern the rights, privileges, and disabilities of
the class of Chinamen who are resident in the provinces of Canada. They
are also of opinion that the whole pith and substance of the enactments of
section 4 of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, in so far as objected to by the
appellant company, consists in establishing a statutory prohibition which
affects aliens or naturalised subjects, and therefore trenches upon the
exclusive authority of the Parliament of CanadaM
The Committee failed to allude to the fact that the impugned Act was a
racist piece of legislation whose real objective was to exclude Chinese
labour from the mines. It simply based its decision on the very narrow
constitutional ground that under section 95 only Parliament could legislate
with respect to aliens. According to the Committee, the function of a court
of law is to determine the limits of jurisdiction between Parliament and
the provinces: ".. .when that point has been settled, Courts of law have
no right whatever to inquire whether theirjurisdiction has been exercised
wisely or not"! Thus came into being one of the most enduring and
judicially debated opinions in the history of the Privy Council Committee.
In 1902, only a few years after Bryden, the scope of 91 (25) was once
again the subject of argument before the Privy Council. The occasion was
Cunningham and Att. Gen for B.C. v. Tomey Homma and Att. Gen for
Canada.56 The issue: whether or not the legislature of British Columbia,
purporting to exercise the power of a provincial legislature to amend its
Constitution under what was then section 92(1) of the Constitution Act,
54. Supra, note 50, at p. 587.
55. Ibid., at p. 585.
56. [1903] A.C. 151 (P.C.).
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1867, had the power to enact legislation excluding Chinamen, Indians
and Japanese from the electoral franchise in the province. 7
The federal government argued that the Provincial Elections Act,
1899,58 by which British Columbia effected the disenfranchisement of the
Chinese, Indians and Japanese was related to "naturalization and aliens",
a power reserved exclusively for the legislative authority of Parliamenf
by virtue of 91(25). The Committee, however, rejected that contention.
The legislation was valid as an exercise of the power it held to amend the
Constitution of the province.
Bryden was referred to but distinguished. The racism and prejudice
that were the obvious motivation for passing the innocuous legislation,
were not a factor. According to the Committee, "the policy or impolicy
of such enactment as that which excludes a particular race from the
franchise is not a topic which their Lordships are entitled to consider".59
Bryden and Cunningham are irreconcilable. Bryden is clear that only
Parliament may legislate with respect to aliens. It also suggests that
perhaps only Parliament may legislate with respect to the consequences
of "naturalization."
Cunningham, on the other hand, is equally clear that:
The language of [section 91(25)] does not purport to deal with the
consequences of either alienage or naturalization. It undoubtedly reserves
these subjects for the exclusivejurisdiction of the Dominion-that is to say,
it is for the Dominion to determine what shall constitute either or the other,
but the question as to what consequences shall follow from either is not
touched. 6o
Commenting on the two decisions, John Spencer has said that "within
four years, the Judicial Committee seems to have erected side by side two
similar sign posts, each pointing in opposite directions to what is
supposed to be the same place. '61 The confusion sowed by these
contradictory sign posts continued to dodge the "naturalization and
aliens" debate for a long time thereafter.
57. Section 92(1) provided as follows:
92. In each province the Legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to matters coming
within the classes of Subject hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
1. The amendment from time to time, notwithstanding anything in this Act, of the
Constitution of the Province, except as regards the office of the Lieutenant Governor.
S. 92(l) was repealed in 1982 and replaced by s. 45 of the Constitution Act, 1982.
58. S.B.C. 1899, c. 25.
59. Supra, note 56, at p. 155.
60. Supra, note 56, at pp. 156-7.
61. John Spencer, "The Alien Land Owner in Canada" (1973), Vol. LI, No.3, Canadian Bar
Review 389, at 399.
444 The Dalhousie Law Journal
In Re the Coal Mines Regulation Act and Amendment Act, 1903 of
British Columbia,62 the issue was whether or not the province could
prohibitthe employment of the Chinese in positions of trust orresponsibility
in or at a mine, and whether it could prohibit their employment below
ground. The province had argued they were "unsuited by certain
idiosyncrasies from being safely employed below ground." The Court of
Appeal for British Columbia, however, held the legislation to be a
trenchment upon the exclusive authority of Parliament and invalidated it.
In Quong Wing v. The King,63 on the other hand, the Supreme Court of
Canada upheld a statute of the province of Saskatchewan that prohibited
the employment of white women in restaurants, laundries, or other places
of business or amusement, that were kept, owned or even simply
managed by the Chinese, Japanese or other people of Oriental origin. It
was held to be a valid exercise by the province of its legislative power over
"property and civil rights" and in "matters of a merely local or private
nature", whose object and purpose was "the protection of white women
and girls." That it discriminated against the Orientals was irrelevant.64 As
the Court saw it, the question before it was "not one as to the policy or
justice of the Act in question but solely as to the power of the provincial
legislature to pass it."65
62. (1904), 10 B.C.R. 408 (B.C.S.C.).
63. (1914), 18 D.L.R. 121 (S.C.C.).
64. Davies J., took the view that this case was different from Bryden, which had protected the
Chinese. He said, ibid., at p. 128:
"I think the pith and substance of the legislation now before us is entirely different. Its
object and purpose is the protection of white women and girls; and the prohibition of
their employment or residence, or lodging, or working, etc, in any place of business or
amusement owned, kept or managed by any Chinaman is for the purpose of ensuring
that protection. Such legislation does not, in my judgment, come within the class of
legislation or regulation which the Judicial Committee held ultra vires of the provincial
legislatures, in the case of The Union Collieries v. Bryden....
The right to employ white women in any capacity or in any class of business is a civil
right, and legislation upon that subject is clearly within the powers of the provincial
legislatures. The right to guarantee and ensure their protection from a moral standpoint
is, in my opinion, within such provincial powers and, if the legislation is bonafide for
that purpose, it will be upheld even though it may operate prejudicially to one class or
race of people." [Emphasis added].
65. Per Davies J., ibid., at p. 125. He continued, at p. 27:
"What objects or motives may have controlled or induced the passage of the legislation in
question I do not know. Once I find its subject matter is not within the powers of the Dominion
Parliament and is within the powers of the provincial legislature, I cannot inquire into its policy
or justice or into the motives which prompted its passage."
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The Court does not state why the white women and girls needed
protection. It does not say either why the Act singled out only white
women and girls for this type of protection and excluded native and Black
women and other women of colour. What is clear from the legislation and
the analysis of the Court is that the federal-provincial struggle as to who
had the most power to legislate discrimination and oppression for those
that were not white was being disguised as a debate about constitutional
legislative authority over "naturalization and aliens."
Several other cases have dealt with the issue of legislating for aliens.
In Re Oriental Orders In Council Validation Act, B.C.,6 6 the Supreme
Court of Canada, on the principle in Bryden, held that a provincial
legislature did not have the power to enact legislation that automatically
attached to all contracts, leases and concessions between the government
and private capital, a clause that prohibited employing Japanese and
Chinese in connection with the contract or lease. This decision was,
however, quickly overturned by the Privy Council on appeal in
Brooks-Bidlake and Whittall Ltd. v. Att. Gen. of British Columbia67 and
in Att.-Gen. of British Columbia v. Att.-Gen. of Canada.61 All the gains
that had been made were once again lost.
More recently, section 91(25) has been raised in Morgan et al v.
Att.Gen. P.E.L69 on appeal from the Supreme Court of P.E.I., in banco;7 °
in Re Min. of Revenue for Ontario and Hala et al;71 in Re Dicknsen and
Law Society ofAlberta;72 and in Redlin et al v. University ofAlberta.73 As
stated earlier, the section was tangential to the decision in Andrews.
However, because of section 15 of the Charter, on the basis of which
Andrews was decided, it was not necessary for the Court to engage in a
section 91(25) analysis.
In Morgan, the issue was whether or not The Real Property Act of
Prince Edward Island which prohibited non-residents from owning land
save with the written consent of the province, conflicted with the federal
66. (1922), 65 D.L.R. 577 (S.C.C.).
67. [1923] 49 S.C.R. 440, [1923] 2 D.L.R. 189 (P.C).
68. [1923] A.C. 450, [1923] 4 D.L.R. 698 (P.C.).
69. [1976] 2 S. C. R. 349.
70. (1974), 5 Nfld. & P.E.I.R 129 (P.E.I.S.C.).
71. (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3) 710 (O.H.C.J).
72. (1978), 84 D.L.R. (3d) 189, 5 Alta. L.R. 920 136 (S.C.T.D.).
73. [1980] 4 W.W.R. 133 (Alta. C.A.)
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jurisdiction over naturalization and aliens under 91(25). 74 Chief Justice
Bora Laskin for a unanimous Court held that it did not, and that the
legislation related to property and civil rights in the province. The test
suggested by him was this:
The question that would have to be answered is whether the provincial
legislation, though apparently or avowedly related to an object within
provincial competence, is not in truth directed to, say, aliens ornaturalised
persons so as to make it legislation striking at their general capacity or
legislation so discriminatory against them as in effect to amount to the
same thing.75
In the analysis of the Court, the Act did not affect aliens qua aliens, but
rather affected non-residents, citizen or non-citizens. The Act did not
impose a total prohibition. It merely imposed a regulatory scheme. In the
context of the history of the province and the scarcity of land as a resource
therein, the discrimination imposed by the Act was justifiable.
Morgan represents a further erosion of the federal power under 91(25)
and a further dilution of the ratio in Bryden. In Re Minister of Revenue,76
the Ontario High Court of Justice upheld a statute of the province of
Ontario that imposed a higher property transfer tax upon non-residents
than it did upon residents. The Court argued the legislation related to the
acquisition and holding of land in Ontario and did not offend section
91(25).
Likewise, in Re Dicknsen, an attack upon a provincial statute that
stated that only Canadian citizens and British subjects were eligible for
enrolment as members of the provincial law society, on the ground that
it violated the principle of section 91(25) was dismissed by the Trial
Division of the Alberta Supreme Court on the basis that the statute did not
in pith and substance deal with either alienage or naturalization.
74. The Real Property Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1951, c. 138, as enacted by S.P.E.I. 1972, c. 40. s. 1.
Section 3 of the Act provided:
3 (1) Persons who are not Canadian citizens may take, acquire, hold convey, transmit or
otherwise dispose of, real property in the province of Prince Edward Island subject to the
provisions of sub-section two (2) here next following.
(2) Unless he receives permission so to do from the Lieutenant-Governor-in-Council, no
person who is not a resident of the province of Prince Edward Island shall take, acquire, hold
or in any other manner receive, either himself, or through a trustee, corporation, or any such
the like, title to any real property in the province of Prince Edward Island the aggregate total
of whichexceeds ten (10) acres, norto any real property in theprovinceof Prince Edward Island
the aggregate total of which has a shore frontage in excess of five (5) chains.
75. Supra, note 69, at p. 364.
76. Supra, note 71.
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The last reported case in which a challenge to a'provincial statute was
founded on section 91(25) prior to the entrenchment of the Charter in the
Constitution was the Redlin v. Governors of the University of Alberta77
case. A resolution of the respondent university had established a fee
differential for foreign students. This resolution was assailed on the
ground it related to aliens and naturalization and the resolution and its
parent legislation were ultra vires as offending section 91(25). The Court
dismissed this claim holding that as the resolution did not prohibit foreign
students from registering or taking instructions at the University it did not
violate the section 91(25) principle and was a valid exercise of the
provincial power in relation to education.
Following the incorporation of the Charter in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court of Canada had occasion to consider a challenge to a
provincial statute that prohibited the admission into a provincial bar
society of applicants who were not Canadian citizens. The occasion was
Andrews. The statute: the British Columbia Barristers and Solicitors
Act.78 The facts were identical to Re Dicknsen. The analysis in Andrews
was, however, conducted in the context of the equality provisions of the
Charter contained in section 15. The challenge was framed in terms of the
citizenship requirements of the statute constituting discrimination within
the meaning of section 15 and not in terms of the statute being legislation
in relation to aliens, which offended the exclusivity principle of 91(25).
In fact, the latter section was not even mentioned. Only Justice Wilson
considered Re Dicknsen 79and only Justice La Forest referred to Bryden. 0
Andrews transformed the "alien" in Canadian immigration law from
a mere object over which the federal and provincial governments would
from time to time quarrel respecting competence to legislate or discriminate
in relation thereto, to ahuman being with rights and benefits. Unfortunately,
it took the Charter, and a privileged, Oxford trained, middle-class white
male, to achieve what "aliens", most of them persons of colour, had been
struggling to achieve over the decades without success: equality. This is
only testimony to the fact that the English legal system can not be
entrusted with the protection of minorities, short of special safeguards.
To sum up the discussion of the power to legislate with respect to
naturalization and aliens, it may be suggested that the courts have
interpreted this power to mean that only Parliament may legislate with
respect to aliens and with respect to what constitutes naturalization. The
77. Supra, note 73.
78. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 26, s. 42. [am. 1983, c. 10, s. 21, schedule 2].
79. Supra, note 49, at p. 35.
80. Ibid., at p. 39.
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provinces may legislate with respect to the consequences of naturalization
and alienage; incidental infringement of section 91(25) would not limit
their power to legislate in areas of their specific competence.
III. Immigration and Federal Provincial Relations
The proposal to constitutionalize immigration agreements will impact on
both the balance of immigration power under the Constitution and on the
political relations between the provinces and the federal government. In
my view, the exercise of a concurrent power presupposes a degree of
cooperation between the two levels of government and an interest and
willingness to undertake joint complementary policy initiatives. In those
circumstances, it becomes necessary that I examine how the federal
government and the provinces have in the past dealt with immigration
matters, and that I particularly examine the initiatives that have come
forth from some of the provinces. This may be accomplished by briefly
looking at four separate periods in the history of the evolution of
immigration policy in Canada. These are: the period of close co-operation
following Confederation (1867-1870); the era of confrontation, mostly
with British Columbia (1871-1914); the provincial "hands off" period
(1914-1960); and the period of revival of select, but in some instances
persistent, provincial interest in immigration matters (1960-present). To
this I now revert.
In the period immediately following Confederation, there was
recognition by the federal and provincial governments of the need to
coordinate their respective policies and to collaborate in the use of the
concurrent power under the Constitution. At a meeting held shortly after
Confederation, the two levels of government concluded a
federal-provincial agreement which .established the contours of their
respective responsibilities. The federal government would establish
immigration offices in London, England and in such other places in the
United Kingdom and the European continent as it saw fit. It would also
maintain quarantine stations in several parts of Canada. The provincial
governments would determine policy respecting the settlement and
colonization of uncultivated land. They would also be entitled to set up
agents in Europe who would be accredited by the federal government."
Furthermore, the federal government and the provinces agreed to meet
annually on irrmigration matters and, until 1874, met regularly. The
essence of immigration, at the time, was to regulate the conditions of
travel of the immigrants and to settle the vast vacant lands.
81. Journal of New Brunswick Legislature, 1869, pp. 59-63.
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This co-operative effort seems to have changed when British Columbia
entered Confederation. As a colony of Britain, British Columbia had a
sizable Chinese presence. For as long as it was part of the British imperial
fold, it was willing to tolerate the Chinese and to limit their harassment
and oppression. When it ceased to be a colony, however, and became a
province within the Canadian Confederation, racism came to the fore. It
led to a period of confrontation and protracted legal and political battles
between the two levels of government. In some cases, outright disallowance
of statutes by the federal government was the outcome. On the other hand,
there is no evidence to suggest that the relations between the federal
government and the provinces during this period were anything but
passive and normal.
Provincial passivity was also the norm with all the provinces including
British Columbia from the period 1914 to around 1960. It has been
suggested that the provinces have shied away from immigration
notwithstanding the concurrent power under section 95, in order to leave
apolitically sensitive and controversial area of public policy to the federal
government. 2 The area has foreign policy and national security
implications which are better handled by the federal government. One
additional reason for the absence of provincial enthusiasm was the severe
economic depression in the periodbetween the World Wars. The provinces
felt, and have continued to feel, that they do not have the resources
necessary to assume financial responsibility for the settlement and
integration needs of the immigrants.
Whatever the causes of lack of interest, by the 1960s, some provinces,
notably Ontario and Quebec, were becoming more active in immigration
matters. The government of Prime Minister Mackenzie King had adopted
an aggressive, albeit restricted and racist, immigration policy83 and the
numbers of immigrants arriving were increasing dramatically when
82. Dalon, "Immigration: Federal-Provincial Co-operation", in Bonin, ed., Immigration:
Policy-Making Process and Results (The Institute of Public Administration of Canada: 1974).
83. See statement by Prime Minister MacKenzie King to the House of Commons on May 1,
1947, with respect to immigration. The Prime Minister said in this statement:
"With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination.
I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the
persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a 'fundamental human
right' of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy."
See Debates of the House of Commons, Thursday May 1, 1947, p. 2644 at 2646.
Mackenzie King was defending the policy of prohibiting immigrants from Asia, the Chinese,
the Japanese and the East Indians from immigrating to Canada. Even though his government
eventually repealed the Chinese Immigration Act, the restrictions on Asian immigration
continued until 1962. The statement "served as the official formulation of Canadian immigration
policy, until 1962." See Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Public Policy and Public
Concern (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972).
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compared to those that had landed during the period between the World
Wars. By the 1960s as well, Quebec had come to realise that natural
reproduction alone would not be enough to maintain the
demographic-linguistic balance between herself and English-speaking
Canada. Quebec had also realised that federally controlled immigrant
selection and settlement would not be sufficient to provide adequate
compensation for its declining population. 4 Action was required. Quebec
responded by establishing in 1960, a Quebec Immigration Service within
the provincial Ministry of Cultural Affairs. In 1968, it passed its own
immigration legislation, 5 establishing a provincial department to
disseminate information and facilitate immigration into the province.
Ontario also increased its activities in the recruitment of skilled employees
but without passing a provincial immigration law. The present era of
revived interest in immigration by some provinces had started.86
The Quebec Initiative With Immigration Agreements
(i) Immigration Agreements, 1971-78
Three years after it passed the Immigration Department Act, 7 Quebec
signed a bilateral agreement with the federal government relating to
immigration. This was the 1971 Accord, also known as the Lang-Cloutier
agreement. The main achievement of Lang-Cloutier was the agreement
by the federal government to allow Quebec orientation officers to be
stationed in overseas Canadian immigration offices. Their function
would be to provide immigrants who had chosen Quebec as their
province of destination, with further information about the living and
working conditions in that province beyond that which the federal
recruiting officers would have supplied. The stationing of orientation
officers overseas was not the first time Quebec was represented abroad
in immigration matters. Quebec had always maintained an agent general
in Paris."'
84. Bonin, "Immigration: Policy-Making Process and Results-Summary of Discussions", in
Bonin, ed., supra, note 81, atp. 22.
By the 1960s, ithad been predicted that without intervention most of the immigrants to that
Province would have continued to be mostly English speakers and that four-fifths of those
would have been established in Montreal.
85. Immigration Department Act, supra, note 28.
86. On the history and activities of both Ontario and Quebec in immigration, see Hawkins,
supra, note 83, chap. 7 and 8.
87. Supra, note 28.
88. Vineberg, "Federal-Provincial Relations in Canadian Immigration" (1987), 30 Public
Administration 299, at p. 302.
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There had been two major developments in Canadian immigration
policy during the ten years immediately preceding the 1971 agreement,
both of which would have had an impact on Quebec. In 1962, changes had
been made to the immigration regulations, limiting the scope of the racist
policy that prohibited the immigration into Canada of non-European
immigrants. 9 And in 1967, the point system had been introduced as the
basis for recruitment and selection of immigrants coming into Canada.90
While these "liberal" policies had worked well for English Canada by
allowing the admission of English speaking immigrants of varied origin,
they had not been as positive for Quebec. They had adversely affected,
almost undermined, the substratum of Quebec's linguistic and cultural
vitality. Most of the immigrants who became eligible to immigrate as a
result of this reform were mostly Anglophones destined for Ontario and
British Columbia, or, if theywentto Quebec, they were destined principally
for the City of Montreal.91
The Lang-Cloutier agreement was supersededby the Andras-Bienvenue
agreement of 1975. The latter recited the fact that Canada and Quebec had
concurrent constitutional responsibility for immigration and that it was
necessary to encourage immigration into Quebec, of immigrants who
either spoke French or had the potential for speaking French. It created
a framework within which Quebec and the federal government would
consult each other and exchange information prior to selecting and
recruiting temporary workers and immigrants into Quebec. The Canadian
immigration official would be required to provide to his Quebec
counter-part, all information pertaining to applications from immigrants
89. The immigration regulations of September 17, 1954, made by Order-in-Council P.C.
1954-1351 were abolished and replaced by the regulations made by Order-in-Council P.C.
1962-86 of January 18, 1962. The latterregulations broadened the acceptable source countries
to include Turkey, North, Central or South America, Egypt, Israel and Lebanon, in addition to
Europe.
90. The pointsystem in its initial form was introduced byregulations madeby Order-in-Council
P.C. 1967-1616, of August 16,1967. Those regulations have been repealed and replaced by the
current Immigration Regulations, 1978, supra, note 44, as amended.
91. Quebec's concerns at the time towards immigration were best stated by Bonin, supra, note
83, at p. 22, summarizing the discussions at a seminarof the Institute-of Public Administration
on Immigration, held June 1976. He said:
"Since 1960, there has been a collapse of Quebec's birthrate and the relative impact of
foreign immigration on the evolution of the Quebec population is greater, much is
therefore at stake because of that impact. Two thirds of foreign immigrants entering
Quebec each year do not speak French. Over four fifths of these immigrants will live
in Montreal, an area where the balance is not 80% Francophones for 20% Anglophones
as is the case for Quebec as a whole, but much nearer 60-40. if these trends continue,
what will become of the Montreal region in 25 or 30 years? That is certainly a question
Quebec is entitled to ask".
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intending to settle in Quebec. The Canadian official would also take into
consideration the opinion of the Quebec representative before making a
decision to accept or reject such an application. It broadened Quebec's
role from that of giving information to applicants per excellence, to that
of active participation in the selection decision making. It was a major
improvement over the first agreement.
In 1978, a third agreement, the Cullen-Couture agreement was
concluded. In addition to granting Quebec the right to participate in the
selection of immigrants to thatprovince, it created ajoint federal-provincial
committee whose mandate was to ensure continued future cooperation.
As well, it gave Quebec a virtual veto as to which immigrant would be
landed in that province under the "independent category." 9 In effect,
immigration became expressly recognised as a tool that Quebec could
employ to strengthen its French language and cultural heritage. Quebec,
in return, agreed to allow indigent immigrants access to its social
assistance services. This was an important concession especially for
refugee claimants. It symbolised a willingness by at least Quebec to
contribute toward immigrant assistance settlement and integration as
some kind of quid pro quo.93
(ii) Canada-Quebec Accord on Immigration, 1991
The 1978 Cullen-Couture agreement has now been repealed and
superseded by the Canada-Quebec Accord on Immigration, concluded by
the federal government and Quebec on February 5,1991, and which came
into force on April 1, 1991 (herein after the "Accord"). 94 The Accord is
based on twenty years of experience by Quebec with immigration
agreements and is a perfect model of what the Meech lake proposals had
anticipated. It was inspired by the Cullen-Couture agreement. Like its
92. The term "independent immigrants" generally refers to immigrants who are neither
members of the family class, nor Convention refugees, or Convention refugees seeking
resettlement, or members of designated classes the admission of members of which would be
in accordance with Canada's tradition with respect to the displaced and the persecuted.
93. Article V(2) of Cullen-Couture stipulated that"Immigrants acknowledged by Quebec to be
indigent will also have access, from their arrival, to Quebec social assistance". At the time this
agreement was concluded, a lot of uncertainty existed about the eligibility of indigent
immigrants, especially Convention refugee claimants, for provincial social assistance, and this
was a major concession on behalf of Quebec. See Plaut, Refugee Determination in Canada
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1985), pp.144-149. Unfortunately the Canada-Quebec Accord
that has replaced Cullen-Couture, does not commit Quebec to any contribution to the cost of
immigrant integration. Instead Quebec gets compensated for all the costs of providing the
reception and the linguistic and cultural integration of immigrants into Quebec. See Annex "B"
to the Accord.
94. Canada-Quebec Immigration AccordRelating to Immigration and TemporaryAdmission
ofAliens (Ottawa: Employment and Immigration Canada, February, 1991).
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predecessors, its main objective is to uphold Quebec's demographic,
linguistic and cultural integrity and to preserve its distinct identity.
It reaffirms the mobility rights of permanent residents under the
Charter and purports to reafffirm the guarantee of the equal protection and
equal benefit of the law to everyone without discrimination. It also
reaffirms the principle of family reunification in Canadian immigration
law. The determination of national standards and immigration policy
objectives remain the responsibility of the federal government and so
does the eventual admission of immigrants and control of aliens.
However, it has several features that are unprecedented and are bound
to have a profound impact on the formulation, implementation and
administration of immigration policy in this country. The federal
government, for example, undertakes to pursue an immigration levels,
policy that every year is expected to result in Quebec taking a percentage
of the total number of immigrants coming to Canada, that corresponds
with the percentage of the population of Quebec to that of Canada. These
would include Convention refugees determined to be such within Quebec
and those resettled from overseas in accordance with the Immigration
Regulations, 1978.95
The federal government also agrees to withdraw from the provision of
immigrant settlement, adaptation and language training services which
are transferred to Quebec, and agrees to pay compensation to Quebec for
providing the service. The compensation for 1991-1995, amounts to the
sum of three hundred and thirty-two million dollars ($ 332 M). A formula
is provided in the Accord for the adjustment of this figure in the years to
come. Furthermore, the Accord gives as one objective, "the preservation
of Quebec's demographic importance within Canada and the integration
of immigrants to that province in a manner that respects the distinct
identity of Quebec. ' 96 This is a clear attempt to implement what is an
obvious feature of "distinct society" status that Quebec has been seeking
and that has been recommended by the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee,
even before the constitutional proposals are implemented.97 The federal
government has explicitly agreed in writing that Quebec use immigration
as a tool to maintain a French-speaking majority in that province and to
enhance its culture and civil law tradition. It is difficult to visualize how
Quebec can fulfil these objectives without setting admission 5tandards
that discriminate against immigrants who are not French in language and
culture, in favour of those who are. Yet in my view, until the Constitution
95. Immigration Regulations, 1978, supra, note 44, as amended.
96. Clause 2 of the Accord.
97. Supra, note 6, at pp.26-7.
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is amended to allow fora distinct society status for Quebec, any immigration
admission standards by Quebec to that effect would be inconsistent with
the Charter and would be contrary to objective (f) set out in section 3 of
the Immigration Act, 1976. The latter objective seeks "to ensure that any
person who seeks admission to Canada on either apermanent or temporary
basis is subject to standards of admission that do not discriminate in a
manner inconsistent with the Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms."
While the Accord allocates the responsibility for determining national
standards and objectives relating to immigration to the federal
government,9" the Accord contains no mechanism by which compliance
with those standards and objectives may be monitored. Neither the joint,
nor the implementation, committees are given the mandate to monitor
compliance by Quebec with the national standards and objectives. 99 In
many other respects, the Accord maintains the features of
Cullen-Couture.110
The Initiatives of the Anglophone Provinces
In section two of this paper, I discussed some of the initiatives that British
Columbia took in the area of immigration before and at the turn of this
century. Unfortunately, most of these, as shown, were motivated by racial
prejudice. Even though British Columbia has historically been one of the
largest recipients of immigrants, it has not had a written or articulated
provincial immigration management policy. It has no immigration
legislation and, like Ontario and Manitoba, has not signed any immigration
agreement with the federal government. Ontario, while interested in
immigration, has had a narrow focus: selecting and recruiting skilled
workers for its employers. It has not taken any of the legislative or
aggressive immigration agreement techniques that Quebec has. The only
Anglophone province that has legislation that in a peripheral waydeals
with immigration matters is the province of Alberta: the Department of
Manpower Act.101 The Act assigns the Minister of Manpower the
98. See clause 3 of the Accord, which states that:
"Canada shall discharge these responsibilities...by defining the general classes of
immigrants and classes of persons who are inadmissible into Canada, by setting the
levels of immigration and the conditions for the granting of citizenship, and by ensuring
the fulfilment of Canada's international obligations".
99. See annex"A' to the Accord setting out the modalities for implementation.
100. The Accord is a product of the Meech Lake process. It may be said to be the only
component of Meech Lake that has been implemented. What is laid out above, however, and
the provisions I allude to below are just its bare features and are not exhaustive. For a well
argued critique of the accord based on the proposals as they were in Meech Lake, see Kruhlak,
supra, note 8.
101. R.S.A. 1980, c. D-24.5, first enacted in 1985.
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responsibility for provincial services connected with immigration into
Alberta, and empowers the Minister to conclude agreements with either
the federal or other provincial governments in relation to immigration
services or demographic policies. Pursuant to this Act, the Alberta
Minister of Manpower concluded, in 1985, a three-year agreement on
immigration with the federal government. The agreement deals with the
creation of joint consultative and implementing committees, exchange
of information, and the establishment of general principles for the
selection and settlement of immigrants, including Convention refugees
and members of designated classes under the Immigration Act, 1976.102
It also commits the parties to joint responsibility for the settlement and
adaptation of permanent residents. This is in sharp contrast with what
Quebec has under the Accord at the moment whereby the federal
government pays compensation to Quebec with no contribution from the
province.
Saskatchewan signed an immigration agreement in 1978. It creates a
federal-provincial consultation committee and reaffirms the commitment
of both governments to collaborate in the provision of settlement
services. It further talks about the necessity to encourage and fund
private sector settlement agencies that would assist in the provision of
settlement services to immigrants.
Each of the Atlantic provinces, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince
Edward Island and Newfoundland, has an immigration agreement.
These agreements setup joint committees of cooperation and consultation
but do no more. The selecting, recruiting and settling of immigrants
remain the responsibility of the federal government. The only
responsibility that has been assumed by all the provinces, with or without
agreements, is the review and approval of business immigration proposals
submitted by entrepreneurs and investors under the business immigration
program. 03
IV. Effect of Proposed Amendments to the Immigration Provisions of
the Constitution
The discussions in the foregoing sections attempt to bring out what is
thought to be the status quo of both the constitutional power and the
federal-provincial relations in immigration. This includes the status of
existing immigration agreements. It also attempts to highlight some of
102. Supra, note 9.
103. Interview with Frances De Wolfe, Business analyst, Nova Scotia Department of
Economic Development, Halifax, N.S.
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the contemporary issues and concerns associated with these two areas. It
is this ordering of things that the federal government has proposed to
amend during the current round of constitutional debate. The substance
of the amending proposals as initially outlined in Meech Lake, and
recently put in the Beaudoin-Dobbie report may be summarised as
follows. Upon a requestby any province that is interested in doing so, the
federal govemrment would negotiate with that province, for the purpose
of concluding an agreement in immigration that is appropriate to its
needs. Any such agreement would have the force of law ifit were declared
to do so by resolutions of the House of Commons, the Senate and the
legislature of the province involved. It would, however, only be valid as
long as it were not repugnait to, or incompatible with, any national
standards ind objectives set by Parliament, and would be subject to the
Charter. Unless stated otherwise in the agreement, its amendment could
not be effected, except with resolutions from the House of Commons, the
Senate and the legislature of the relevant province. For purposes of this
paper, we may call any agreements that would be signed by virtue of any
such provision in the Constitution, "constitutional immigration
agreements."
The Government's Rationale for the Proposals
It would appear that the proposals for constitutional immigration
agreements were put forward first in Meech Lake and now in the
Beaudoin-Dobbie report for two reasons. The main one, in my view, is
that they were the means of fulfilling the demand for greater control over
immigration policy which the government of Quebec had made as one of
the conditions for accepting the Constitution. The second one is that the
federal government hoped it would entice the remaining provincial
governments, most of which have been reluctant to take any concerted
interest in immigration matters, into playing a more active role in the
formulation, implementation and management of immigration policy. It
must have reasoned that the best way to accomplish this was to enshrine
in the Constitution a standing offer to negotiate agreements on demand
and to constitutionalize those agreements. It had conceded a similar
demand to Quebec. These two reasons, however, are not what the
government has articulated in its justification and rationalization of the
proposals. The argument has instead been that the Constitution ought to
be the basis of all immigration agreements so that they become more
safeguarded and secured from unilateral termination by either the federal
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government or the provinces.3 4 There is no doubt that in comparison with
immigration agreements made pursuant to the Immigration Act, 1976,
any agreements pursuant to the proposed amendments to the Constitution,
would be harder to change or terminate especially if they acquired the
force of law in the manner suggested by the proposals. However, there is
equally no doubt that the reasons for the proposals go beyond the
argument of security alone as put forward in justification.
There is, in fact, already in existence a framework under which
immigration agreements with the provinces may be, and have been,
negotiated in the past. This framework is to be found in section 108(2) of
the Immigration Act, 1976 which reads as follows:
108.(2) The Minister, with the approval of the Governor-in-Council, may
enter into an agreement with any province or group of provinces for the
purpose of facilitating the formulation, coordination and implementation
of immigration policies and programs.
In my view, this subsection creates a positive duty upon the federal
government to conclude immigration agreements with provinces in the
same way and to the same degree and effect as would be the case if this
duty were to arise by virtue of a provision in the Constitution. The first
two agreements that were signed in 1971 and 1975 with Quebec were in
fact concluded before the ImmigrationAct, 1976, and before the provision
cited above ever existed. The 1978 Cullen-Couture agreement and the
1991 Accord were signed pursuant to this provision. Similarly, all the
other six provinces that have concluded immigration agreements with the
federal government, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island,
Alberta, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland, negotiated and signed their
agreements by virtue of the Immigration Act, 1976.
In order to fully appreciate the effect of subsection 108(2), it is
necessary to read it in conjunction with section 7 and subsection 108(1),
both of the ImmigrationAct, 1976. Section 7 requires the federal Minister
of immigration to annually lay before Parliament a report specifying the
number of immigrants that the Minister proposes to allow in the country
during a stated period. The report has to be "after consultation with the
provinces concerning regional demographic needs and labour market
considerations." Furthermore, under subsection 108(1), the Minister has
to consult with the provinces respecting the measures to be taken to
104. The Beaudoin-Dobbie Report, supra, note 6, states, at p. 80:
"The main objective of the federal government's proposal is to give immigration
agreements stability by preventing them from being amended or revoked without the
agreement of all governments that are parties to them. The Committee considers that
this objective is commendable."
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facilitate the adaptation of immigrants to Canadian society. The section
provides:
108(1) The Minister shall consult with the provinces respecting the
measures to be undertaken to facilitate the adaptation of permanent
residents to Canadian Society and the pattern of immigration settlement in
Canada in relation to regional demographic requirements.
Section 108(2) allowing agreements to be concluded between the federal
government and the provinces is, therefore, not just an isolated provision.
It is part of a comprehensive programme under the Act intended to foster
federal-provincial consultation, policy coordination and cooperation. As
agreements signed pursuant to the Immigration Act, 1976 come about as
a result of an Act of Parliament and not the Constitution, we may, for
purposes of this article, call them "statutory immigration agreements."
Constitutional Immigration Agreements versus Statutory Immigration
Agreements
As has been seen from section 108(2) of the Immigration Act, 1976,
statutory immigration agreements are subject to the approval of the
Governor-in-Council. This means that they have to be approved by
Cabinet and that they are totally dependent upon the political will of the
federal government. A province anxious to conclude an agreement may
find itself unable to do so when it wishes. On the other hand, constitutional
immigration agreements would be negotiable on demand by a province.
One important point to note, however, is that under the proposals, the
right to demand negotiations would belong to the provinces and not to the
federal government. The federal government would not be able to force
an unwilling province to the negotiating table. This being the case,
amendment of the Constitution in this respect may not necessarily mean
much unless a change occurs in provincial attitude towards immigration.
Statutory immigration agreements can be revoked by either party.
Constitutional immigration agreements, if declared to have the force of
law, would be subject to a special amending formula, and would be more
difficult to change.1°5 While this is an advantage, it is also a disadvantage.
It is an advantage because it would eliminate frivolous and irrational
amendments and prevent unilateral revocation. It is a disadvantage
105. Sections 95D and 95E proposed in the Beaudoin-Dobbie Report would require that an
immigration agreement that were declared to have the force of law by virtue of resolutions of
the House of Commons, the Senate and the Legislature of the province concerned, be amended
only either as may be set out in the agreement, or by resolutions of the House of Commons, the
Senate and the Legislature of the province that is party to the agreement. See text to note 7,
supra.
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because it would remove the flexibility inherent in administratively
negotiated deals. By its very nature, immigration policy is constantly
changing and in a state of flux. There may be times when for legitimate
reasons, it may be desirable to have an agreement amended. This could
be the time when the'necessary consent is withheld. Rigidity, therefore,
may end up working hardship for both parties to an agreement, and may
thus be a double edged and dangerous weapon. 106
Furthermore, a constitutional immigration agreement, if it had the
force of law, would be subject to a special amending formula. It would
also be binding upon Parliament and the legislatures. Acquiring the force
of law would necessitate a declaration to that effect by the
Governor-General based on resolutions of support and consent from the
House of Commons, the Senate and the legislature of the province
affected. By contrast, statutory immigration agreements are not binding
upon Parliament or the legislatures and do not enjoy the protection of a
special amending process.
If the major criticisms against statutory immigration agreements are
that they are not protected against unilateral action, create uncertainty,
and are not binding upon Parliament and provincial legislatures, the
proposal by the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee respecting approval of
intergovernmental agreements, may be the solution. The proposal would
see an amendment to the Constitution allowing approval of
intergovernmental agreements by one of two methods. Either legislation,
or resolutions of the House of Commons, the Senate and the legislature
of the province in question. Revocation of, or amendments to, these
agreements would require the same process unless stated otherwise by the
agreement.107 Such aprocess would give all intergovernmental agreements,
including statutory immigration agreements, the desired degree of stability
and protection against unilateral revocation.
National Standards and Objectives versus Provincial Agenda and
objectives.
One of the reasons advanced for the proposals is that an amendment to the
Constitution would enable any province to negotiate an agreement
"appropriate to the needs and circumstances of the province." As we have
106. For a supporting view, see the discussion in Canadian Bar Association, Rebuilding A
Canadian Consensus: An Analysis of the Federal Government's Proposals for a Renewed
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1991), pp. 299-300.
107. For a discussion of the proposal to amend the Constitution to permit approval of
intergovernmental agreements, see theBeaudoin-DobbieReport, supra, note 6, pp.6 8-69. For
the textof the proposed amendments, see ibid., pp.116-117.
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seen, this is not the language that is used in sub-section 108(2) of the
Immigration Act, 1976. It is believed that the suggested amending
language is intended to result in constitutional agreements that address
regional concerns, and address unique concerns of provinces such as
Quebec, whose main objective since the mid-1960s has been to use
immigration policy as a tool to maintain its demographic-linguistic
balance and cultural integrity. Yet it is significant that the absence of this
language did not prevent the conclusion of the 1978 Cullen-Couture
agreement, or the 1991 Accord.
Accepting, however, that agreements that are appropriate to the needs
and circumstances of the provinces would enhance the amelioration of
regional disparity and concerns, the question that still remains is the
extent to which redress of regional grievances can go without
compromising national standards and objectives and without undermining
immigration policy and services. This question is not mere conjecture.
History has shown the provinces to be irresponsible wielders of
immigration power towards minorities, especially people of colour. This
was the case with British Columbia and Saskatchewan, as we have seen
in the earlier discussion in this paper. It was also the case in Nova Scotia
and Ontario before Confederation. The anxiety that has been expressed
about the proposals among visible minority Canadians is to be attributed
to this experience.103 It is, of course, true that the federal government has
been as guilty of racism and discrimination in immigration as the
provinces have been. In comparative terms, however, it has practised a
more subtle form of racism than the provinces.
In order to ease these fears and concerns, the proposals suggest
Parliament retain its paramountcy in setting national standards and
objectives. These would include establishing general classes of immigrants,
setting levels of immigration, and prescribing classes of inadmissible
individuals. Any constitutional immigration agreement that had the force
of law would be valid only and for as long as it was not repugnant to those
standards and objectives.
108. It is this experience thatfrightens minority communities abouttheproposed decentralisation
of immigration policies, especially immigrant settlement and adaptation services. The Report
of the Select Committee of the New BrunswickLegislative Assembly on the 1987 Constitutional
Accord, (1989), noted that groups representing cultural minorities that had appeared before it,
had expressed fear "about the possibility of discrimination if the provinces gained more
autonomy over immigration policy." See Select Committee, Legislative Assembly of New
Brunswick, Final Report on the Constitution Amendment 1987 (Fredericton: Legislative
Assembly of New Brunswick, 1989), p. 52.
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While this provision would offer some comfort, it would not provide
full and adequate protection against abuse of immigration power by the
provinces. Repugnancy becomes effective only if Parliament has set
national standards and objectives butnot otherwise. Undertheimmigration
Act, 1976 and the Immigration Regulations, 1978, Parliament has set the
objectives of Canadian immigration policy, the principles thereof, and
categories of admissible and inadmissible individuals. 1°9 Parliament has
not, however, set national standards or levels in the area of integration of
immigrants. There are no language training standards, no prescribed
minimum levels of economic or adjustment assistance, and no minimum
levels of assistance that the provinces would have to offer in connection
with job hunting, counselling or other forms of immigrant settlement and
integration service.
Even if the paramountcy of national standards and objectives may be
effectual, there still remains the issue of monitoring. Who is to monitor
the policies of the provinces especially where they are not translated into
legislation, to ensure compliance with the national standards and
objectives? Can resort to judicial review alone be seen as adequate
protection against this potential for provincial checker-board immigration
policies? And if so by who; the immigrants or the federal government? It
is significant that the joint and implementing committees that were
established under the Canada-Quebec Accord on immigration do not
have as a specific mandate the monitoring of compliance by Quebec, with
the national standards and objectives. Was this Accord not supposed to
be the model that future agreements would follow?
V. Conclusion
Immigration power under the Constitution Act, 1867 is grounded in
sections 95 and 91(25) of that Act. Section 95 grants Parliament and the
legislatures the concurrent power to pass laws in immigration and
agriculture. Under section 91(25), on the other hand, the power to
legislate with respect to "naturalization and aliens" is allocated to
Parliament alone. The historical analysis and interpretation of section
91(25) has affirmed the exclusive role of Parliament to legislate with
respect to aliens and with respect to the requirements for naturalization.
But the section has also been interpreted as to uphold provincial legislation
that is within the competence of the legislatures even if it may incidentally
affect aliens.
109. Supra, note 9, ss. 3, 4, and 19.
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Even though the Constitution allows the provinces to legislate in the
area of immigration, in modem times only Quebec has passed a
comprehensive immigration law. There was some provincial legislation
in immigration at the turn of the century most of which came from British
Columbia. Most of that legislation was enacted for reasons of racial
prejudice and not to promote immigration. The effect of the experience
with British Columbia has been to create a lack of confidence in the
provinces by many visible minority Canadians. They do not trust the
agendas that the provinces would have in the event they wielded effective
power in immigration as the proposals would in effect do.
There is, however, room for all the provinces to play a more active role
in immigration than they have done hitherto. They could assume some
selection and recruitment functions as they have done with the business
immigration program. They could also assume the provision of the
linguistic and economic integration services, including language training
and general counselling. The impact of immigration policy on provincial
areas such as education, employment, housing, health, manpower, the
economy, and social services, is too important to be left to the federal
government alone.1 10
Increased provincial involvement should, however, not mean
substitution of provincial for federal services by the former taking over
all responsibility from the latter. Federal-provincial immigration
agreements should not amount to blanket transfers of immigration power
by the federal government to the provinces. This is one extreme that has
occurred under the Accord.II' In my view, it would be disastrous to offer
the remaining nine provinces, the type of agreement that Quebec now has
with the federal government.
On the issue of national objectives and standards, it would not be
possible to pre-set national objectives and standards in all areas of
immigration concern. Even if it were possible, there are no satisfactory
means of monitoring compliance with these objectives and standards by
the provinces.
I believe immigration agreements concluded under the framework of
the Immigration Act, 1976, as opposed to constitutional immigration
agreements, would be the best way of achieving the desired objective of,
on the one hand, increasing provincial participation and, on the other,
110. See Dalon, supra, note 77. See also, Lemieux, "Immigration: A Provincial Concern",
(1983), 13 Mani. L.J. 111.
111. Under Clause 24 and Annex "B" to the Accord, the federal government has agreed to
withdraw from the provision of linguistic, cultural and economic integration services which
will be assumed by the provincial government in return for financial compensation to Quebec.
The Constitution and Immigration: The Impact of the Proposed Changes 463
ensuring there is no compromise to national objectives and standards. To
be more effective and secure they would have to be approved as suggested
by the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee with respect to approval of
intergovernmental agreements in general. The approval process would
give the agreements the stability and protection they require. If this were
done, there would be no necessity to amend the immigration power under
the Constitution as it presently stands.
The provinces may, but need not, supplement any agreements made
under the Immigration Act, 1976 and approved as an intergovernmental
agreement with their own immigration statutes. A provincial immigration
statute would be a good way of showing the interest, priority and policy
of the province concerned. It is important to realise, however, that the
absence of a statute ought not hold back those provinces that to date have
only had peripheral interest in the matter. A provincial statute is not a
prerequisite for provincial participation in immigration. While the fact is
that under section 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867 the provinces have
power to legislate concurrently with the federal government in
immigration, this alone is not a compelling reason for them to do so.
